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NUCLEAR CRISIS STABILITY
IN SOUTH ASIA
Sumit Ganguly and Kent L. Biringer
Relations between India and Pakistan have been fraught
with conflict since their emergence from the detritus of the British Indian
Empire in 1947.  In the British Indian Empire, there were two classes of
states.  One set of states, those of British India, was directly under the tute-
lage of the British Crown.  The others, the so-called princely states, were
nominally independent as long as they accepted the British as the paramount
power in the subcontinent.  Since their independence from England, India and
Pakistan have had markedly divergent concepts of nation building and
quickly became embroiled over a territorial dispute involving the former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
The origins of this conflictual relationship have been discussed at length
elsewhere.1  Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars, in
1947–48, 1965, 1971, and 1999.  The last conflict did not see a formal decla-
ration of war but easily met the criteria for a full-scale war.  Apart from these
engagements, much strife and tension have characterized the Indo-Pakistani
relationship.  More to the point, bilateral and multilateral efforts to resolve
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outstanding issues have met with little success.2  The end of the Cold War,
which helped reduce tensions in various troubled regions of the world, did
little or nothing to unravel the South Asian conundrum.  The Indo-Pakistani
conflict, which had preceded the intrusion of Cold War concerns into the
subcontinent, continued unabated.
Since May 1998, in the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests,
the strained relationship has been further exacerbated.  Two events in particu-
lar have contributed to the dramatic deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations.
The first was Pakistan’s attempt to breach the Line of Control (LOC) near
Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir in April-June 1999; the second was the over-
throw of the civilian Pakistani regime of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif
that October.3  The breach of the LOC inflamed public opinion in India, espe-
cially in light of the attempt earlier the same year to reduce tensions through
the inauguration of a bus service linking the border towns of Amritsar and
Lahore.  The military coup that month further eroded an already denuded
relationship as India’s decision-makers placed even less trust in a Pakistani
military regime.  Not surprisingly, India went on to increase its defense
budget by 28% and a fiscally troubled Pakistan raised its defense spending by
11%.  These budgetary increases took place despite numerous U.S.-supported
bilateral sanctions imposed on both countries in the aftermath of the nuclear
tests of 1998.  It is important to underscore that the impact of bilateral sanc-
tions on India and Pakistan was quite disproportionate.  Pakistan’s weaker
and more internationally integrated economy suffered far more than that of
India.4
As the year 2000 drew to a close, both sides continued to accuse each other
of fomenting discord.  India accused Pakistan of abetting terrorism in Kash-
mir, while Pakistan maintained that it was merely providing moral and diplo-
matic support for Kashmiris seeking their “inalienable right of self-
determination.”  Despite these problems, a series of positive unilateral actions
did take place near the end of the year.  These included an Indian cease-fire
2. For a discussion of various attempts to settle Indo-Pakistani differences, see Sumit
Ganguly, “Discord and Collaboration in India-Pakistani Relations” in Interpreting World Poli-
tics: Essays for A. P. Rana, eds. Kanti Bajpai and H. C. Shukul (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
1995).
3. For a discussion of the October coup in Pakistan, see Sumit Ganguly, “Pakistan’s Chronic
Coups,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2000), pp. 2–7.  The literature on the Kargil conflict is
voluminous.  For the Government of India’s formal report, see the Kargil Review Committee
Report, From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000); for a critical ac-
count, see Praveen Swami, The Kargil War ((New Delhi: Leftoword, 2000).
4. For a discussion of Pakistan’s economic situation two years after the sanctions, see Ahmed
Rashid, “Short-Term Relief,” Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), October 19, 2000, p. 86.
For an analysis of India’s economic status, see Joanna Slater, “Oil and Water Shock,” FEER,
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in Kashmir and a Pakistani withdrawal of some forces along the LOC.5
While little or no formal strategic dialogue developed between the two sides,
some actions such as advanced notice of missile launches have been contin-
ued.  There are also a growing number of Track II efforts to engage strategic
thinkers on issues of regional nuclear stability.  Additionally, a number of
U.S. based nongovernmental organizations and universities have sought to
promote nuclear dialogue in the region.  However, despite continuing negoti-
ations with the U.S., especially between the U.S. and India, neither India nor
Pakistan showed willingness to curb their nuclear weapons and ballistic mis-
sile programs.
Crisis Stability and Nuclear Safety
In this state of heightened tensions, lack of dialogue, and declared nuclear
weapon status, concerns over the stability and safety of a nuclearized subcon-
tinent abound.  Possession of nuclear weapons carries with it the potential for
severe consequences in the course of normal and abnormal situations.  What
constitutes crisis stability and nuclear safety and why is it of such signifi-
cance in the Indo-Pakistani context?
Crisis stability is a measure of a country’s incentive not to strike preemp-
tively in a crisis.  Simply stated, it involves avoiding escalating to the top
rung of the nuclear ladder in order to beat the adversary.  Crisis stability is
considered high when the incentives to strike first are low.  It is of considera-
ble significance in the Indo-Pakistani context for two compelling reasons.
First, the region has witnessed a number of wars and crises.  At least two of
these crises may have had a nuclear component.  Second, the mutual incen-
tives to strike first would be great when the two sides have limited and vul-
nerable nuclear forces.  Consequently, both sides would have strong incen-
tives to strike first to prevent preemption.  At the time of this writing and for
the foreseeable future, both sides will have limited and potentially vulnerable
nuclear forces.  In addition to the problem of ensuring crisis stability, other
sources of nuclear instability stalk the region.  A number of scenarios can be
envisioned that could threaten stability.
Technical failures can compromise nuclear stability.  Mechanical or elec-
trical malfunctions could result in a nuclear accident.  Such malfunctions may
be the result of factors such as design flaws, material aging, or mishandling.
Accidents and other situations in which weapons are exposed to severe envi-
ronments (e.g., fire, flood, and earthquake) pose potential safety and security
risks.  Failures of command and control procedures could lead to the unin-
5. For a discussion of the thinning out of forces along the LOC, see Karthik Nagarajan and
Teresita C. Schaffer, “Pakistan Update,” South Asia Monitor, Number 33, May 1, 2001, South




 http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/41/6/907/272349/as_2001_41_6_907.pdf by Indiana U
niversity Bloom
ington user on 05 N
ovem
ber 2020
910 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001
tended launch of a nuclear-armed missile.  A rogue launch of a nuclear
weapon could precipitate a nuclear exchange.  Security breaches could result
in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups or subnational
actors.  In the absence of robust surveillance capabilities, either side could
launch nuclear weapons on the basis of faulty intelligence warnings.  Such
warnings could, for instance, erroneously report missile attacks requiring a
quick response.  A weapon-release authorization could also occur at the time
of a nuclear weapons detonation before determining whether such a detona-
tion was the result of an attack or an accident involving one’s own weapon.
Finally, instability is possible when faced with ambiguous but disturbing evi-
dence of a massive conventional attack and the need to decide rapidly on the
preemptive use of nuclear weapons.  This is especially the case when signifi-
cant conventional military asymmetry exists in a hostile dyadic relationship.
Accordingly, in the Indo-Pakistani case, a Pakistani decision-maker, faced
with seeming evidence of a massive Indian conventional attack, may be
tempted to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons.
It is easy to exaggerate the fears of the likelihood of nuclear war in South
Asia.  Despite their long history of conflict and turmoil, neither India nor
Pakistan is ruled by revolutionary regimes intent on fundamentally transform-
ing the global or even the regional order though the use of force.  This point
is hardly of trivial significance in this discussion of nuclear stability in the
subcontinent.  Even professedly revolutionary states, driven by profound ide-
ological hatred, such as the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), stopped short of nuclear escalation during the Ussuri River clashes of
1969.6  That said, there might still be some cause for concern about nuclear
stability in the region.  The principal sources of such concern stem from cer-
tain structural dimensions of the subcontinent, including the oddities of politi-
cal geography, the ongoing conflict over Kashmir, the particular features of
strategic doctrines, and the lack of diplomatic dialogue.  Each of these con-
cerns deserves discussion.
Unlike in the U.S.-Soviet case and much like the Sino-Soviet one, India
and Pakistan have little or no warning time once either side launches ballistic
missiles.  An inadvertent or even deliberate but unauthorized missile launch
from one of the border areas of either India or Pakistan has the potential of
striking major cities within a span of a few minutes.  Such short flight times
dramatically reduce the margins for error.  In a crisis, and in the absence of
various agreed-upon technical limitations on missile flight paths and testing
routines, both sides would have every reason to assume the worst of the
other.  Under such crisis conditions, a false warning of an impending missile
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attack could lead one side or the other to strike first.  Once launched, there
would be little or no opportunity to alert the other side of an accidental or
unauthorized launch.
Doctrinal issues can and are compounding the peculiarities of political ge-
ography on the subcontinent.  Long before it tested nuclear weapons, Paki-
stan had moved toward an offensive military doctrine to cope with its lack of
geographic depth.7  There is little reason to believe that it has eschewed such
a conventional military posture despite its acquisition of some nuclear weap-
ons capabilities.  Is there any evidence that Pakistan has abandoned such a
conventional military doctrine?  There is little reason to think so.  Even after
its overt acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities, Pakistan can ill-afford to
concede territory to India in the event of a war.  To this end, Pakistan has
refused to accede to a no-first-use status.  If Indian forces were to be pressing
at its borders, Pakistan would reserve the right to threaten the adversary with
nuclear weapons.
Though hard evidence to that end is difficult to come by, it is possible to
infer that India, too, intends to carry the war into Pakistan’s territory. 8  To
avoid the possibility of quick nuclear escalation, Indian defense planners ar-
gue that they would not make deep incursions into Pakistani territory but
would escalate horizontally along a band of territory along the international
border.9  Such a strategy may not necessarily assuage Pakistani anxieties.
Pakistani military planners may still fear that such a broad-banded incursion
may simply be the prelude to a deeper thrust along vulnerable salients.
The long history of conflict and turmoil reinforces the misgivings in both
capitals about each other’s intentions.  Worse still, hyper-nationalist propa-
ganda has the propensity of bolstering the direst assessments of each other’s
goals and likely behavior.10  Worse still, the ongoing conflict in Kashmir
(which shows few, if any, signs of abating) makes elites in both Islamabad
and New Delhi even more suspicious and wary of each other’s moves.  Paki-
stan continues to fecklessly supply the insurgents and India shows little imag-
7. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
8. This can be best inferred from the configuration of the last major Indian military exercise,
“Brasstacks.”  This exercise almost brought the two sides to war through a process of mispercep-
tion and miscalculation.  For an analysis of the Brasstacks crisis, see Kanti Bajpai et al., Brass-
tacks and Beyond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi:
Manohar, 1995).
9. Based upon a personal interview with a senior Indian military officer, New Delhi, August
2000.
10. For a discussion of the role of hyper-nationalist propaganda in heightening tensions, see
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ination in forthrightly addressing the genuine grievances of the Kashmiris.11
Continued massacres of civilians by the insurgents and periodic crackdowns
by the security forces on the same population sustain the forces of hostility,
instability, and violence in a seemingly never-ending spiral.
Finally, in the aftermath of the Kargil episode and the subsequent military
coup in Pakistan, the diplomatic dialogue between India and Pakistan has
come to a complete standstill.  India insists that it cannot hold a dialogue with
Pakistan until the latter ceases support for the insurgents in Kashmir.
Parenthetically, India adds that it will not discuss its internal arrangements in
Kashmir with Pakistan.  Pakistan, by the same token, insists that it will be
ready to start a dialogue with India only when the “core issue” of Kashmir is
on the negotiating table.  These two antithetical positions have contributed to
a political deadlock.
Key Concerns and Information Needs
In a region faced with a variety of security concerns, it is important to under-
stand how these concerns drive strategic decision making and contribute to
increased or decreased stability.  The role that information plays in this pro-
cess is key.  It will be necessary to strike a balance between providing trans-
parency in which access to information adds to confidence and stability rather
than undermining it, and maintaining opacity and ambiguity to ensure the
deterrence sought by the regional players.
In assessing information needs, one must start with identification of the
issues of greatest concern.  The results will help define the sets of desired
information.  The categories of information needed may support a variety of
purposes that include confronting issues of asymmetry in capabilities, assess-
ing weapon system alert status, addressing safety concerns, and evaluating
use control and implementation policies and effectiveness.  Information on
these concerns may be necessary for demonstrating treaty compliance when
agreements exist or for building confidence and showing goodwill in periods
prior to formal agreements.  In addition to the transparency and opacity issues
mentioned earlier, concerns over release of classified information may also
be an impediment to obtaining desired information.
Because balance and parity are such important considerations in assessing
strategic stability, information on quantities and capabilities of weapons sys-
tems will be a critical element in maintaining stability. Concerns over vul-
nerability and sufficiency of forces to mount a credible counterstrike can only
be addressed by assessing force structure and capability.
11. Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge:




 http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/41/6/907/272349/as_2001_41_6_907.pdf by Indiana U
niversity Bloom
ington user on 05 N
ovem
ber 2020
SUMIT GANGULY AND KENT L. BIRINGER 913
Perhaps of greatest concern from the standpoint of stability is the issue of
weapon alert status.  Information that can provide insights into the alert status
and readiness levels of adversarial forces can prevent unnecessary escalation
of alert status that risks spiraling out of control toward nuclear employment.
This information needs to be provided in ways that do not introduce vulnera-
bilities to the systems that one possesses. The goal is to have sufficient warn-
ing times to allow for resolution of any possible misinterpretations.  Informa-
tion that can discriminate between actual (e.g., missile attack) and perceived
threat (e.g., missile test flight) will be a critical factor in maintaining nuclear
stability.
While safety may be viewed as an issue only loosely connected with nu-
clear stability, the fact is that nuclear accidents could become the kindling for
a full-scale nuclear conflagration.  Nuclear accidents that result in a nuclear
yield could be misinterpreted as attacks on nuclear sites.  This may be espe-
cially true at times of conflict or conventional war.  Other accidents that re-
sult in dispersal of radioactive material may pose environmental and human-
risk hazards across international boundaries.  Information that can provide
early warning of such accidents or help characterize such events could be-
come critical to peaceful resolution of these severe events.  This issue is more
than assessing the adversary.  Providing transparency of one’s own safety
status may also avoid misinterpretation by the other side.
Another category of concern is that of security, doctrine, and use control of
nuclear forces.  There may be a need for adequate information to ensure that
weapons are accounted for and secure.  This includes the need to know that
responsible national entities maintain possession and control over these
weapons of mass destruction.  It may also include the need to know under
what conditions such weapons would be deployed.
In addition to these broad categories of concern over regional nuclear capa-
bilities, future agreements may dictate that specific information is to be pro-
vided to demonstrate treaty compliance.  Such information might include
numbers of weapons, absence of weapons in nondeployment zones, yields or
other weapon system capabilities, stocks of materials, training or test activi-
ties, and others.  As an example, in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, there was a need to declare num-
bers and basing of treaty-limited items.  There was also a need to specify
missile dimensions in order to distinguish between treaty-prohibited and
treaty-permitted missile production at the Russian missile plant in Votkinsk.
In the absence of agreements requiring information exchange, sharing such
information may or may not lead to stability.  For example, stating the num-
ber of weapons one has in the absence of a weapons limitation agreement
could cause an arms race or cause one side to seek advantage over another.
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to target their destruction in a preemptive strike.  It remains a delicate politi-
cal balance to negotiate the appropriate level of transparency to bring stability
without destabilizing the deterrence equation.
Stabilizing Measures and CBMs
Several stabilizing measures could be undertaken to reduce nuclear concerns
that lead to instability.  Those discussed here are not exhaustive but represent
approaches that could be used to build confidence while addressing issues of
concern.
Notifications represent an initial step in transparency.  They can be particu-
larly useful in avoiding misinterpretation that can lead to escalation of tension
or conflict.  Some of these provisions have already been incorporated into
security agreements between India and Pakistan.  For example, the April
1991 agreement between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice on Mili-
tary Exercises, Maneuvers, and Troop Movements specifies notification re-
quirements for land, naval, and air force exercises beyond prescribed levels.
The agreement spells out specific timelines and the categories of information
that are to be provided.  Formalizing similar measures with respect to nuclear
concerns could have an equally important impact.  Notification of movement
or test launch of nuclear capable missiles could avoid misinterpretation and
the potential for preemptive military strike.  The Lahore Declaration and
Memorandum of Understanding in February 1999 recognized the importance
of missile launch notification.  Since that time, launch notifications have been
provided unilaterally in the spirit of Lahore and in the absence of a more
formalized agreement.  For example, that April the following Indian news
item appeared: “But determined to preserve the Lahore momentum, India in-
formed Pakistan and the great powers of the impending Agni test on April 9
two days before the event.”12  Similarly, in Pakistan a Foreign Office state-
ment on the subsequent Ghauri missile test noted, “Pakistan had given prior
notification of this test to India in accordance with the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding signed in Lahore in February.”13
Concerns over misinterpretation of missile launch data are not only theo-
retical but also historical.  During the course of the Cold War there were a
number of incidents involving accidents and misinterpretations related to nu-
clear weapons and delivery systems.  Scott Sagan has documented many of
these occurrences.14  One example of misinterpretation of missile-related
data cited by Sagan was the 1979 inadvertent placement of a training tape
12. “Missile Tests and the Lahore Spirit,” Hindu, online edition, April 14, 1999.
13. “Pakistan Test-Fires Ghauri-II,” News (Pakistan), April 15, 1999.
14. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons
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showing a missile attack into the live warning system.  Six minutes were
needed to assess the threat before determining it was false.  While that was
sufficient time in the context of U.S./USSR intercontinental missile threats,
such time would not be available with the short flight times associated with
Indian and Pakistani missile threat.  Another incident in 1980, which resulted
from a failed computer chip, again led to a false indication of missile attack.
Thus, given the small but non-zero likelihood of these or other such inci-
dents, it is essential that India and Pakistan institutionalize the practice and
procedures associated with adequate communications, launch notification,
and anomaly resolution.
While missile launch notification has implications for immediate crisis sta-
bility, other forms of notification may be less urgent but of significance in
building confidence and reducing tension.  Examples include notification of
nuclear material shipments and movements, sharing of atmospheric radiation
levels around nuclear facilities, or notification of exercises utilizing nuclear
capable forces or equipment.
Declarations may be undertaken unilaterally or as part of formalized agree-
ments.  These declarations are often associated with quantities of military
equipment.  Declaring the number of missiles, missile launchers, nuclear
weapons, or nuclear-capable aircraft would be an essential early step in any
effort to set arms control limits on these weapon systems.  Because of the
small and potentially vulnerable nature of the nuclear arsenals of India and
Pakistan, it is unlikely that either side would undertake such declarations uni-
laterally but rather would wait for such time as required under terms of a
negotiated treaty.  The impact of other nuclear nations in the region, such as
China, will also be a factor in any agreement on limits of nuclear capability.
Hotlines offer an opportunity for direct contact between military or gov-
ernment officials in order to defuse tense situations before they escalate to
conflict or beyond to employment of nuclear capabilities.  In South Asia, hot-
lines currently exist between the Directors General of Military Operations
(DGMOs).  They are generally used for communicating about border and
other conventional military actions and activities.  In the past they have been
used for disinformation as well as for intended purposes.15  Because of the
strategic nature of nuclear weapons, a hotline among heads of state is needed
as well to address the most serious issues of conflict including escalation
toward nuclear weapon use.  While heads of state in India and Pakistan have
communicated at past points of conflict, there does not currently exist a dedi-
cated hotline for such purposes.  This could be an important tool in managing
future crises.
15. Sumit Ganguly and Ted Greenwood, ed., Mending Fences: Confidence and Security
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Other efforts could be undertaken to reduce the state of readiness of nu-
clear weapons systems that minimize chances for accidents and require time
and deliberate actions to prepare for deployment and potential use.  Some of
these approaches are thought to characterize the current state of nuclear
weapon deployment in India and Pakistan.  One such approach is that of de-
mating, which separates the nuclear warhead from the delivery system.  By
removing the warhead and possibly storing it in a separate location, a time
delay is built in that slows the escalation to weapon deployment and use.
Additional time delays could be introduced by further disassembling or dis-
abling components of nuclear weapons systems.  This disassembly or disable-
ment may be of the warhead itself or other elements of the launch and
delivery vehicles.
Another form of de-alerting a nuclear weapon system is to store the
weapon and delivery system.  Deploying the system would then involve mov-
ing it to a launch location.  If systems are stored at locations out of range of
potential targets, then greater delay is introduced in moving the system to
forward deployed locations within range of intended targets.  In fact, the es-
tablishment of nondeployment zones could be an element of a nuclear stabil-
ity regime in the region.  Maintaining liquid-fueled missiles in an unfueled
state also contributes to a de-alerted status.  Providing physical barriers or
other impediments to launch is another form of maintaining a de-alerted
weapon system.  These physical barriers, of course, would have to be sub-
jected to periodic checks through agreed-upon methods of surveillance to en-
sure that they had not been dismantled surreptitiously.  Alternatively, these
barriers could be suitably armed with tamper-resistant alarms.  Attempts to
dispense with these alarms would signal the other side that some unautho-
rized activity was taking place at facilities such as storage or launch sites.
Detargeting seeks to prevent unintentional launch on enemy locations by
programming harmless target coordinates into a missile guidance system.  In
that case, any accidental launch will not result in weapons systems impacting
on the territory of an adversary.  The U.S. and Russia have detargeted their
strategic missile systems as a confidence building measure (CBM).  Often
broad ocean areas are chosen as default target locations for such missile
detargeting.
Concerns over weapon safety and use control are important elements of
stability.  In the U.S. in the late 1950s a general government nuclear weapon
policy was established to assure public safety.  In part, it stated “that nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons systems require special consideration because
of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the
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protected against the risk and threats inherent in their environment.”16  The
associated safety standards were as follows:
· There will be positive measures to prevent weapons involved in accidents or inci-
dents or jettisoned weapons from producing a nuclear yield;
· There will be positive measures to prevent deliberate arming, launching, firing, or
releasing except upon execution of emergency war order or when directed by com-
petent authority;
· There will be positive measures to prevent inadvertent arming launching, firing, or
releasing; and
· There will be positive measure to ensure adequate security.
A positive measure was defined as “a design feature, safety device, or proce-
dure that exists solely or principally to provide nuclear safety.”17
Incorporation of these concepts in the use of South Asian weapons could
reduce the likelihood of accident or weapon use.  In the U.S., extensive pre-
cautions have been taken to prevent unauthorized nuclear weapon use.  Ac-
cording to Stansfield Turner:
In some of our weapons systems, two keys must be turned nearly simultaneously to
launch a nuclear weapon, and whenever feasible the keys are physically separated
so that one person could not turn both.  In others there is an electronic locking
system whereby a coded message must be received and inserted into the locking
device to unlock it.18
While such features as codes and keys may contribute to stability by better
controlling access and use of weapon systems, international nonproliferation
objectives have prevented any sharing of these capabilities with India or Pa-
kistan.  In the interest of reducing the nuclear danger in South Asia, the new
U.S. Congress and administration may reconsider specific provisions of this
legal impediment.
Imposing limits on nuclear weapon system capabilities and thereby avoid-
ing a full-scale arms race may also be seen as stabilizing measures.  These
limits may be placed on the numbers, alert status, basing locations (land, sea,
and air), or system tests.  These limits are the elements from which arms
control agreements are derived.  However, some progress unilaterally in these
areas may build confidence on an informal level that could translate later into
formalized agreements.  The current self-imposed moratorium on further nu-
16. Stanley D. Spray, “History of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Safety Assessment: The Early
Years,” SAND96-1099C, Sandia National Laboratories, presented at International Symposium
on Science and Society, Moscow, May 1996.
17. Ibid.
18. Stansfield Turner, Caging the Genies: A Workable Solution for Nuclear, Chemical and
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clear testing by India and Pakistan is an example of such constraint even at
times of heightened tensions.
Monitoring and Inspection Options
in Support of Stabilizing Measures
and CBMs
As India and Pakistan proceed toward full-fledged weaponization, the dan-
gers of crisis stability will increase steadily.  Consequently, it is in their inter-
ests to pursue political initiatives and adopt certain technological mechanisms
to reduce the prospect of crisis instability.  While there is value in unilateral
stabilizing measures of the types described above, there is often a need to
verify such actions in order to have confidence in the notifications or de-
clared actions of an adversary.  Such verification demands a reciprocal will-
ingness to reveal information for the benefit of lessening tensions and
reducing threats.  In addition to providing information needed to address con-
cerns, the cooperative efforts to collect the information can become CBMs.
How can cooperative monitoring play a useful role in reducing these nu-
clear dangers in South Asia and contribute to crisis stability in the region?
Cooperative monitoring involves a variety of technologies and procedures
that generate greater transparency and knowledge about the numbers and
types of weapons systems and their deployment status.  The purpose of such
monitoring is to reduce the dangers posed by accidents, inadvertent decisions,
and faulty intelligence.  To this end, cooperative monitoring techniques can
conceivably cover the entire gamut of a country’s nuclear weapons infra-
structure.  In addition to direct monitoring of weapons or missiles, the infra-
structure includes but is not limited to production facilities, storage sites,
launch sites, and test sites.  Monitored activities may include such actions as
movements, training, fueling, loading, assembling, or testing of systems or
components.  Monitoring options include on-site inspections, remotely moni-
tored ground-based sensors, and satellite or aircraft-based remote sensing.
These technologies and procedures may be used to verify accuracy of decla-
rations and notifications, assess readiness and deployment status of weapon
systems, confirm integrity of weapon security, or evaluate potential weapon
system capabilities.
Two caveats are in order.  First, all of these technological mechanisms,
while increasing transparency, can also have attendant risks.  The task before
regional decision-makers will be to decide the extent to which these mecha-
nisms can reduce the nuclear danger without compromising national security.
Second, none of these mechanisms in and of themselves can contribute to
nuclear stability.  They will all have to be embedded in political, organiza-
tional, and institutional routines, repertoires, and agreements to ensure that
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amples show ways in which monitoring can be used to verify compliance
with agreements and lead to greater nuclear stability.
If limits are imposed on the number or type of weapon delivery systems, as
was the case in many Cold War nuclear agreements, cooperative monitoring
through on-site inspections can be used to verify initial declarations and peri-
odically reconfirm compliance.  The use of unique tags to identify controlled
items can help ensure that all items are properly inventoried.  Inspections are
used internationally as an essential element of many nuclear, chemical, and
conventional-forces treaties.19  Inspections may be bilateral or multilateral.
Inspections may also reveal other characteristics, such as the presence or ab-
sence of nuclear warheads on missiles using portable radiation sensors.
Other features of the alert status of forces such as warhead mating, missile
fueling, and launcher readiness can be assessed as part of an inspection re-
gime.
Assessing deployment status could also be enhanced by using remote
ground-based monitoring and overhead remote sensing.  By monitoring activ-
ity levels, for example around key missile facilities, advance notice is pro-
vided of events that could be threatening.  Such sensor-based monitoring can
be continuous.  Sensors, such as seismic, magnetic, acoustic, and passive in-
frared devices, with appropriate telecommunication links can be deployed.
Once in place, with proper and periodic maintenance, they can provide timely
warning of the movement of missiles within or from a particular facility.
These sensors can also be linked to camera or video systems that characterize
the nature of the sensor activation by providing photographic images of the
events.
To enable monitoring at night, video cameras with thermal imaging capa-
bilities can be added.  The installation of video equipment may appear to be
even more intrusive.  However, because of limited fields of view for video
systems, it is possible to limit the surveillance capabilities of these cameras
and thereby reduce their intrusiveness relative to other means of monitoring
such as inspections.  To provide further confidence to anxious adversaries,
sites can be monitored with instrumented fences using fiber-optic cables or
sensor-activated taut wire systems to provide alarms and warnings about at-
tempts to breach the perimeter of sensitive sites or surreptitiously transfer
missiles out of a protected compound.  It is important to underscore here that
these surveillance capabilities, though seemingly intrusive, have another ex-
tremely useful by-product.  They can greatly enhance the safety and security
of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.  The existence of these surveil-
lance mechanisms would reduce the danger of unauthorized release or move-
19. For example, the U.S./Russia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Chem-
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ment.  This concern is especially great in South Asia where insurgent groups
may attempt to seize nuclear weapons from their peacetime deployments.
In addition to monitoring storage or deployment locations, such ground-
based monitoring systems could be used to assess production activities at
weapons plants.  For example, the U.S. and Russia have been monitoring
missile production at missile plants in both countries under terms of the INF
Treaty.  Characterizing missile production is achieved through a combination
of technical and manual inspection means.  While this is not a crisis stability
issue, it does relate to longer-term issues of symmetry and strategic balance
in the region.
In the South Asian context, such a set of arrangements could help assuage
fears about the abrupt movement of missiles in the midst of a crisis, espe-
cially since certain missile batteries are believed to be located in states near
the borders of India and Pakistan.  A possible security objection to the intro-
duction of these sensors needs to be addressed, namely, that the installation
of these sensors would alert both sides to the location of key missile emplace-
ments.  This objection is dealt with initially by agreeing to limit the deploy-
ment of these sensors to well-known facilities.  Subsequently, when the
political climate so permitted they could gradually expand the number of fa-
cilities to be so monitored.  Aerial and satellite imagery could be used as
tools to reveal deployment of forces over wider areas and may detect clandes-
tine activities not monitored at declared facilities.
Other mechanisms also exist for providing warning of alert status.  For
example, active seals can be installed on missiles or their erector-launchers.
Such a seal might need to be removed to mate a warhead to a missile or to
raise the missile launcher into a firing position.  By linking these seals with
electronic transmission devices, real-time evidence of a change in alert status
can be provided to those monitoring an agreement.  While such evidence by
itself does not constitute a direct threat, it could set into motion the means for
resolving the issue before greater escalation of conflict.
Three distinct technological features could also assuage possible concerns
about cheating and deception.  The presence of multiple sensors would pro-
vide a degree of redundancy and thereby reduce the ability to fool or cheat
any single device.  The sensors could also be equipped with “state of health”
mechanisms that would periodically provide information about their contin-
ued and reliable functioning.  Finally, they could also be configured to pro-
vide data authentication.  This is a mathematical process of ascertaining that a
given signal or set of signals are indeed authentic.
Missile launches provide another source of instability.  Missile test flights
may be misconstrued as attacks.  Therefore, agreeing to notify and jointly
monitor missile test flights could avoid possible threat misperceptions.  In-
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that such flights do not pose immediate danger to the other side.  In addition
to providing prior notification of all missile tests, the two sides could also
forswear the testing of missiles along particular trajectories and notify each
other of any accidental or unauthorized launches.  In order to address this
problem, the Memorandum of Understanding (attached to the Lahore Decla-
ration of February 1999) signed by Prime Minister Sharif and Prime Minister
Vajpayee calls for the development of mechanisms to prevent unauthorized
or accidental use of nuclear weapons.
If there are agreed limits on weapon system capabilities, technology can be
used for assessment of some elements of capability.  For instance, after the
Gulf War in 1991 Iraq was prohibited from possessing missiles with a range
in excess of 150 km.  Camera systems were installed at missile test stand
locations to monitor the size and burn time of missile motors tested there to
verify compliance with these limits mandated by the U.N.
Finally, the cooperative deployment of airborne radionuclide monitoring
offers a near-term option for nuclear cooperation that can be used to verify
safe radiation levels associated with nuclear programs within Indian and Pa-
kistan.  It has safety and public health implications and, in the early stages of
cooperation, may be less controversial than most of the monitoring concepts
suggested by this article.
In the prevailing political climate in South Asia, the demands of these in-
trusive, on-site inspections or sensor deployments seem all but impossible.
However, both Indian and Pakistani decision-makers may find it to be in their
long-term mutual interest to forge such monitoring regimes.  The fashioning
of such a regime could reduce the danger of crisis instability by increasing
the assurance that the other would not be able to rapidly deploy nuclear
forces in the midst of a crisis without being detected.
Not all CBMs lend themselves to monitored solutions.  For instance, it is
unlikely that detargeting agreements can be verified.  The unilateral benefits
of reducing risks from accidental or unintended launch may warrant an un-
verifiable adoption of this policy.  Other challenges remain to be addressed as
solutions for improved nuclear stability are sought.  Providing real-time de-
ployment status without revealing the position of the sensors is one example.
Such systems would provide some degree of transparency without the vulner-
abilities associated with electronic signals that could be used for targeting
items that had transmitting sensors, such as mobile missiles.
The various measures discussed in this paper are not exhaustive, nor do
they constitute a technological panacea for resolving the nuclear conundrum
in South Asia.  However, they constitute a set of possible steps that can be
usefully undertaken to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear tragedy in the region
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Constraints and Limitations
What are the principal constraints and limitations on the forms of cooperation
that we have discussed above?  A number of factors including political will,
state of current affairs, success with initial cooperative efforts, understanding
of options, and fear will help determine which activities can go forward.  In
the end there must be a recognition that cooperation and resolution of conflict
are in the best interests of both parties.
At the very outset, most Indian decision-makers would contend that these
measures cannot be simply bilateral but must necessarily involve the PRC.
There are two responses to this objection.  The first response is that while
India may well face a significant security threat from the PRC, that relation-
ship lacks the immediacy of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear dyad.  India, while it
has an ongoing border dispute with the PRC, has managed to stabilize the
military situation along that border through a series of confidence and secur-
ity-building measures.  Consequently, there is little reason to believe that a
conflict with the PRC is imminent.  More to the point, asymmetries in the
Indian and Chinese nuclear arsenals greatly reduce the likelihood of any sig-
nificant nuclear competition in the foreseeable future.  The second response
is that a set of bilateral measures in the nuclear realm reached with Pakistan
may enable India to then start a similar process with the PRC.
In the U.S., decisions must be made on the degree to which dialogue and
cooperation with countries in the region on these strategic and crisis manage-
ment issues is in the long term interests of stability and nonproliferation.  Al-
though there is interest in not endorsing or encouraging the nuclear develop-
ments in the region, the consequences of ignoring the stability concerns are
equally high.  Recent reports have indicated a consideration by the Bush ad-
ministration of renewing higher level military contacts with India.  They were
suspended as part of the sanctions imposed following the 1998 nuclear tests.
This may be a first step leading to a more comprehensive security dialogue.
In India and Pakistan there is a need to resume dialogue and to explore
incremental steps in improved relations.  Clearly, the prospects of detailed
implementation of strategic agreements are still well in the future.  However,
recent efforts to try to stabilize actions along the LOC may be a first step in
expanding areas of security discussion.  Domestic political concerns must be
addressed and all interested parties must be convinced that peaceful relations
and stability are among the most important national security interests of each
side.
Building Blocks of Cooperation
How does one promote cooperation between two long-standing adversaries
who assume that they must remain the ultimate guarantors of their own secur-
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about the possible means of promoting cooperation in an anarchic interna-
tional environment.20  One possible strategy is for one of the two adversaries
to make a set of unilateral gestures to elicit cooperation from the other.  This
set of unilateral concessions should engender a degree of trust in the other
side and open the pathway to negotiations.  Such an outcome may indeed
result because both sides see a “shadow of the future,” namely the prospect of
repeated interactions over time.21
Might this strategy have any application to the South Asian context?  On
the surface, the method has much appeal.  Surely India as the major power in
the region could well afford to make some unilateral concessions to generate
cooperation.  Unfortunately, two problems immediately loom.  First, it is not
clear what exactly constitutes a cooperative act.  For example, in December
2000, India offered a cease-fire to the insurgents in Kashmir in an attempt to
reduce the level of violence in the state as a precursor to negotiations.  A
number of the insurgent groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen (HUM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,
refused to abide by the terms of the cease-fire and Pakistan expressed only
lukewarm support for it.22  Second, states not only look at the “shadow of the
future” but also are driven by the “shadow of the past.”23  The long history of
tension and conflict between the two states makes leaders extremely wary
and suspicious of even seemingly transparent concessions.  The Pakistani
breaching of the LOC in April–May 1999 after signing the Lahore Declara-
tion in February profoundly reinforced Indian doubts and suspicions about
Pakistani motivations.24
One possible way out of this conundrum would be for an external power to
agree to guarantee the security of one or both parties.  Unfortunately, this is
not a politically feasible proposition.  The only state that could play such a
role would be the U.S., as it possesses the requisite material power to effect
such an outcome.  This prospect, however, is most unlikely.  Despite the
20. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30:2 (January
1978), pp. 167–214.
21. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
22. Barry Bearak, “Pakistanis and Indians Make Moves for Less Strife,” New York Times,
December 21, 2000.
23. The authors are indebted to Professor Kanti Bajpai of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi, for this particular construction.
24. In April 2001, after repeated unilateral extensions of the cease-fire, the Government of
India appointed K. C. Pant, the deputy chairman of the Indian Planning Commission, and a
respected Indian politician to start negotiations with the insurgents and their supporters.  The
initial response from the insurgent groups was not favorable. The principal stumbling block
appeared to be the unwillingness of the Government of India to involve Pakistan in these negoti-
ations.  See B. Muralidhar Reddy, “No Tripartite Talks on Kashmir, Says Nambiar,” Hindu,
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U.S.’s concern about the prospects of nuclear war in the region, the particular
configuration of the country’s political and strategic interests in the subconti-
nent makes such a U.S. role in the region all but fanciful.  More to the point,
Indian decision-makers would not welcome such an enlarged U.S. role, given
their deep distrust of its motives based upon their reading of the U.S.’s Cold
War role in the region.25
What, if anything, can be done to ameliorate the prevailing conditions in
the region?  The U.S. may have to adopt a more calibrated policy toward the
region.  Such calibration does not mean abandoning its nonproliferation
goals.  It would, however, entail making available a range of technologies
and processes to the two antagonists to enable them to promote nuclear sta-
bility in the region and maintain the global nuclear non-use taboo.26
Of course, the U.S. would only transfer these technologies to India and
Pakistan in the context of the willingness of the two sides to agree to certain
political agreements.  In effect, the U.S. strategy of providing technologies to
stabilize the nuclear relationship would proceed in tandem with the pursuit of
various political agreements between India and Pakistan.  The onset of such a
process could eventually help create organizational constituencies in both In-
dia and Pakistan who would see merit to the pursuit of such agreements.  One
hopes that these constituencies quickly would realize the advantages of hav-
ing firm control over their nuclear facilities and limiting the prospect of acci-
dental or unauthorized nuclear usage.  Building trust through appropriate use
of technology while aggressively pursuing diplomatic avenues provides the
best hope of forging a stable security relationship between India and Pakistan
as they enter the new millennium.
25. For an early and excellent statement of Indian misgivings of the U.S. role in South Asia
during the Cold War years, see Baldev Raj Nayar, “Treat India Seriously,” Foreign Policy, vol.
18 (Spring 1975), pp. 133–54.
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